ABSTRACTThe Indonesian people are again urging the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) to reform itself after 27 years of the 1998 Indonesian Reformation. It turns out that the Indonesian National Police have not yet implemented Cultural Reform as well as possible, as evidenced by the frequent use of excessive violence by the police, especially in breaking up mass demonstration, which has resulted in loss of life and injuries, therefore the People s anger at the House of Representatives (DPR) in last August turned into anger at the police. POLRI must seriously follow up on the public s hopes to implement the POLRI s Cultural Reform as best as possible.JISEAS Issue Paper 43Anger at Parliament Resulted in Mass Demonstrations and RiotsIn August 2025, there was a large demonstration in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, demanding the dissolution of the Indonesian House of Representatives due to poor performance by its members. The demonstration invitation was carried out without organization, without command, broadcast through social media, inviting the public to take action together at the Indonesian House of Representatives to reject the fantastic allowances totaling more than one hundred million rupiah (around KRW 8,620,689; KRW 1 = IDR 11.60) per month, especially the housing allowance of IDR. 50,000,000 (KRW 4,310,345) per month on the grounds that the House of Representatives members no longer receive official housing, which was considered to hurt the people, because it was in stark contrast to the wages received by the people, and considering that the people were getting poorer every day. Many people were laid off, unemployed, and living in poverty, but the people's representatives actually received very large allowances.The demonstrations were also held because many people were disappointed with the arrogant attitudes of members of the House of Representatives who appeared to belittle their constituents. These included Ahmad Sahroni from the National Democratic Party (Nasdem), who said, "People who want to dissolve the House of Representatives are the world's idiots!"; Eko Patrio and Uya Kuya from the National Mandate Party (PAN), who were caught on camera dancing after a House meeting with the President and labelled as dancing because of an increase in House allowances; and Nafa Urbach from Nasdem, who was accused of defending the provision of housing allowances because they had to pay expensive rent near the DPR complex. Because the call for demonstrations was considered appropriate to the current situation, many people were attracted to join the demonstrations, including university students, high school students, online motorcycle taxi drivers, and workers.Public anger then spilled over into mass demonstrations across Indonesia, attended by a majority of the younger generation (Gen Z and Millennials). Calls for demonstrations were made through social media. Without any leadership, everyone moved towards the DPR RI and House Buildings in each Province/Regency/City.Instead of being met by their representatives, the demonstrators were very disappointed when none of them met them. Even all members of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) and their staff were working from home to avoid the protesters. What made the demonstrators even angrier was the news that some of the representatives were going on working visits abroad with more vacations using the state budget, which is, in fact, public money, rather than carrying out serious working visits for the benefit of the people. As a result, the demonstrators began to use violence by throwing stones, mineral water bottles, wood, and other objects, as well as destroying the fence of the House complex, writing graffiti, and attacking police officers guarding the House complex, so that the police then took firm action by breaking up the demonstration, which turned into anarchy.Following the failure of Monday's demonstration, the demonstrations resumed on Thursday, August 28, 2025, divided into two actions: the first, a labor demonstration led by Said Iqbal, demanding, among other things, the abolition of outsourcing and the rejection of low wages, held peacefully in the morning. The second, a demonstration by students, high school students, and online motorcycle taxi drivers, was held in the afternoon. Initially peaceful, however, because no leaders or members of the House of Representatives met with the demonstrators, the demonstration turned violent. Water cannons and tear gas were used to disperse the anarchist demonstrators from noon until nightfall.Excessive Violence in Breaking Up Demonstrations Has Resulted in demands for Police ReformDuring the dispersal of the demonstration, anger was triggered against the police, when a Police Mobile Brigade Corps tactical vehicle ran over online motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan, resulting in his death. In an instant, the House of Representatives, previously the people's primary enemy, transformed into the police as the target of public criticism.Anarchic actions occurred everywhere, demanding accountability from the Indonesian National Police. Protesters used various violent methods, including attacking police stations and burning public facilities. In Jakarta, various public facilities were burned by anarchist mobs, including seven toll gates, seven bus stops, four police posts, one police district office, and five police precinct offices in East Jakarta. In Makassar, the Makassar Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) building was set on fire, killing three DPRD staff and one online motorcycle taxi driver, who was beaten by a mob on suspicion of being an intelligence agent. In Surabaya, the east side of the historic East Java Governor s Building was set on fire by a mob, along with several police precinct offices and police posts. In Yogyakarta, the driving license renewal service building and the complaint area of the Yogyakarta Regional Police Headquarters were set on fire by a mob. In Bandung, the People s Consultative Assembly building, located across from the West Java DPRD building, was set on fire by a mob.Police officers across Indonesia subsequently arrested 6,719 people. Of this number, 959 people were identified as suspects, consisting of 664 adult suspects and 295 juvenile suspects.Even though systematic and massive acts of anarchy have occurred and at least 10 people have died, the Indonesian President has refused public demand to form an independent fact-finding team. The President has allowed the National Commission on Human Rights and other State Commissions to conduct an independent investigation. This has disappointed the people because they consider the President to have no sense of empathy, and suspect that the President already knows who is behind it. The suspicion was that behind these acts of anarchy and destruction of public facilities, occurring systematically in almost all major cities in Indonesia, the military was exploiting uncontrollable public anger to induce the president to declare Martial Law, thereby take over security from the hands of the Police.Public attention has returned to the dispersal of the demonstrations by the Indonesian National Police, who were widely accused of using excessive force, including beating and kicking demonstrators and firing tear gas, including the use of expired tear gas canisters, which were considered excessive, caused panic among demonstrators and bystanders who were not participating in the demonstration, who also inhaled the tear gas, causing shortness of breath and watery eyes.The August demonstrations also caused concern among community groups, including celebrities and netizens. They called for the people's demands, known as 17 + 8 , which consisted of 17 short-term demands and 8 long-term demands. These demands were directed at the President, the House of Representatives (DPR), the Chairpersons of Political Parties, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and the Ministers of Economic Affairs. These demands were described as a summary of various public demands. The short-term demands have a deadline of September 5, 2025, and the long-term demands have a deadline of August 31, 2026. Celebrities, netizens, and students will periodically hold demonstrations to demand that all their demands be met.Public calls for the National Police to immediately implement reforms were heard again after the death of Affan Kurniawan. The President even promised to immediately form a National Police Reform Committee to improve the police force after meeting with the National Conscience Movement (Gerakan Nurani Bangsa) a group that was established by National Figures, such as Former First Lady Shinta Nuriyah Wahid and Religious Leaders, at the State Palace on September 11, 2025.It turns out that the Indonesian National Police were already ready to respond to public demands. On September 17, 2025, the National Police Chief issued a decree establishing a National Police Transformation Acceleration Team, consisting of 52 police officers, to evaluate the implementation of the National Police Reforms that have been underway since 1999.Although the President's promise to form a National Police Reform Committee has yet to be fulfilled, the current unfinished Cultural Reform of the POLRI is a momentum for the Indonesian National Police to complete its homework seriously.The importance of re-implementing the National Police Cultural Reform to truly transform the National Police into a professional and humane civilian institutionNational Police Reform has entered its 26th year in 2025, marked by the issuance of Presidential Instruction No. 2 of 1999 by President B. J. Habibie concerning the Separation of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the POLRI.National Police Reform is divided into three aspects: first, the structural aspect, encompassing changes to the police's position within the state system, organizational form, structure, and status. Second, the instrumental aspect encompasses changes in philosophy, doctrine, functions, authority, and competencies. Third, the cultural aspect, namely changes in the mindset and behavior (culture-set), is believed to be correct by the leadership and members of the POLRI. This includes changing the mindset and behavior of the leadership and members of the Indonesian National Police to become professional civilian police officers, mastering their duties to serve, protect, and serve the community, and enforce the law to maintain public security and order. no longer using excessive violence or militaristic actions; respecting human rights; not having a luxurious lifestyle; not being arrogant, where these changes must be reflected in the recruitment system, education, budget, personnel, management, and police operations.The public can see that Structural Reform has been implemented, including the change in the structure of the POLRI to be directly under the President, after previously being integrated into the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) for 38 years and, together with the TNI, under the Minister of Defense/the Chief of Armed Forces.Furthermore, Instrumental Reform of the Indonesian National Police has also been implemented, including the ratification of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the POLRI and other regulations that affirm that the POLRI is a civil institution that is humanistic and respects human rights.Cultural Reform, however, has indeed been implemented, but its transformation will take more time, as cultural reform requires a change in perspective, way of thinking, and behavior that cannot be implemented quickly.Although the POLRI has demonstrated improved performance during the Reform period and garnered public praise, in practice, cases of excessive use of force still draw public attention. Furthermore, the public also observes that some police officers still live lavish lifestyles, behave arrogantly, and even extortion, which is inconsistent with public expectations for a more service-oriented, nurturing, and protective police force, is still needed. This implies that the National Police Cultural Reform must be actively implemented by all leaders and members of the POLRI.The Indonesian National Police Cultural Reform has been a focus of the POLRI Chiefs during the Reformation era. Various efforts have been made by past Chiefs of POLRI, including the development of the 2005-2025 National Police Grand Strategy under the leadership of Chief General Dai Bachtiar (2001-2005), through Decree of the Chief of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia No. Pol: Skep/360/IV/2005 dated June 10, 2005. The Grand Strategy of the Indonesian National Police is divided into three stages, namely Stage I: Trust Building in 2005-2010, Stage II: Partnership in 2011-2015, and Stage III: Strive for Excellence in 2016-2025. With the Grand Strategy of the Indonesian National Police, the leadership and all members of the Indonesian National Police are expected to be able to carry out their duties professionally and independently.During the leadership of the Chief of Police General Bambang Hendarso Danuri (2008-2010), the Cultural Reform of the Indonesian National Police was realized by issuing two Chief of Police Regulations, namely first, Chief of Police Regulation Number 1 of 2009 concerning the Use of Force and second, Chief of Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 concerning the Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Implementation of Duties of the Republic of Indonesia National Police. With the existence of Chief of Police Regulation Number 1 of 2009 and Chief of Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009, it was hoped that it would significantly change the behavior of all members of the Indonesian National Police to be more humane and respect human rights. However, in the journey, it turned out that this hope had not yet been realized properly.During the leadership of National Police Chief General Tito Karnavian (2016-2019), Cultural Reform of the National Police has again become a focus, due to the persistence of corrupt, hedonistic, and excessively violent behavior among police officers when dealing with the public. With the PROMOTER (professional, modern, and trustworthy) work program, the National Police Chief strives to improve the professionalism and modernity of police services to the public to gain public trust. The Promoter (Professional, Modern, and Trustworthy) program launched by National Police Chief General Tito Karnavian has shown positive results. Public trust in the National Police institution continues to increase. The POLRI, which in 2016 was among the three least trusted institutions by the public, is now based on the results of surveys conducted by various institutions, in the top three positions of institutions with the best public trust, including based on a survey conducted by Kompas Research and Development in 2014 to 2018 showing that the level of public satisfaction with the Indonesian National Police continues to increase as follows: 46.7% (2014), 51.2% (2015), 63.2% (2016), 70.2% (2017), 82.9% (2018). To further strengthen the spirit of the Indonesian National Police Cultural Reform, the Chief of Police, General Tito Karnavian, ratified the Regulation of the Chief of Police Number 8 of 2017 concerning State Officials' Wealth Reports (LHKPN), the Regulation of the Chief of Police Number 9 of 2017 concerning Business for Police Members, and the Regulation of the Chief of Police No. 10 of 2017 concerning Luxury Goods.During the leadership of National Police Chief General Idham Azis (2019-2021), the PROMOTER program was resumed. With Telegram Letter No. ST/30/XI/Hum. 3.4/2019/DivPropam, the National Police Chief prohibited all police officers from flaunting luxurious lifestyles.Under the leadership of National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo (2021-to date), public support for the POLRI increased, particularly due to the significant role they played in assisting the government in combating the spread of Covid-19 and increasing community resilience, including strengthening the community's economic capabilities. However, it was unfortunate that when the Sambo case (a two-star police general who killed his staff), Kanjuruhan tragedy (135 football supporters died in a panic as they rushed out of the Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang after inhaling tear gas fired by the police), and Teddy Minahasa case (a two-star police general who sells drugs) emerged in 2022, public trust in the POLRI dropped to an all-time low of 48.5%. To improve public trust, the POLRI Chief initiated the Friday s Approaching People" program, intended to encourage all police officers to be more responsive to the public's voices and implement their expectations. Various efforts to support the government programs in maintaining food security include establishing kitchens that provide free nutritious meals for students, planting corn, and providing affordable food aid. These efforts were welcomed by the public and quickly restored public trust in the POLRI until the death of Affan Kurniawan in the August demonstration messed up everything.The Cultural Reform of the Indonesian National Police that the Public Has Been Hoping for Since the 1998 Reform EraThe public's primary complaint is that the Cultural Reform of the POLRI has not yet been properly implemented. The mindset and culture of the POLRI members have not improved since the New Order era. Consequently, the public still sees many the POLRI members engaging in acts of corruption, excessive violence, arrogance, lavish lifestyles, unprofessional behavior, and even involvement in practical politics.The public is increasingly angry because the POLRI budget is very large, reaching IDR 138.5 trillion (KRW 11,939,655,172,414) in 2025 and IDR 145.7 trillion (KRW 12,560,344,827,586) in 2026, but is not matched by high-quality work.The Indonesian National Police's human resources are the first to be reformed, starting with a clean recruitment process based on a merit system, ensuring that the selected police personnel are qualified individuals. In fact, the POLRI isn't the only one facing clean recruitment issues. Nearly all government recruitment processes are plagued by issues of collusion, corruption, and nepotism, a legacy of the New Order that remains unaddressed to this day. This is why it's so difficult to improve the Indonesian National Police, as the system remains permissive of corruption.In the police force, the public often finds the recruitment process to be less than clean. The term "bribery" is often heard, involving the payment of a sum of money to pass the selection process. The amounts are very big. To pass Police School, people are not reluctant to pay hundreds of millions of rupiah (around KRW 8 million). Meanwhile, to pass the Police Academy, the figure reaches billions of rupiah (around KRW 86 million). Although the National Police always denies it and claims that the police recruitment is clean based on the BETAH system (clean, transparent, accountable, and humanistic), the public still believes that becoming a police officer requires payment. Several cases of bribery have been discovered in the police selection process throughout Indonesia and are being prosecuted. Unfortunately, not all cases are prosecuted, only those that come to light and attract public attention. Although these bribery cases fall under the criminal realm, the process is usually carried out through a code of ethics process with light penalties, and rarely ends in criminal proceedings. On average, if a case occurs, the bribe money is simply returned, thus providing no deterrent effect for the perpetrators, and the incidents are repeated in subsequent years. Some field officers involved are subject to ethical code proceedings, but this process stops at the lower levels, not reaching comprehensively to the higher levels. So, it's not surprising that every year the public continues to hear about bribery cases in police recruitment. The dirty initial process naturally impacts subsequent processes, including the placement and assignment of police officers. Superiors who should be supervising are more preoccupied with finding sources of income for promotion, often even coercing officers to provide money.The public complains that the police still display a militaristic attitude, particularly in handling demonstrations. Despite the National Police Chief's Regulation on the Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Police Duties, the material has not been properly absorbed during training at the Police School and the Police Academy. The lack of discussion and practice on human rights has led to the continued association of violence with the police.Another complaint concerns the police's continued use of tear gas to disperse demonstrations, despite the public still being traumatized by the Kanjuruhan and Rempang tragedies. In the Kanjuruhan case, tear gas was blamed for triggering panic among Aremania football supporters, resulting in 135 people dying, and in the Rempang case, police fired excessive tear gas to disperse a demonstration by Rempang residents opposing the relocation of industrial estates, resulting in 11 elementary and middle school students fainting.Torture during interrogation is also a public complaint. This includes demands for money in handling cases. During the New Order era, the term "KUHP" (the Indonesian Criminal Code) was misused as "kasih uang habis perkara," meaning that a case would be dropped if the accused agreed to pay the investigator. According to data from the National Police Commission (Kompolnas), public complaints about the performance of the Criminal Investigation Department account for 90% of the total annual public complaints, which average 4,000 complaints per year.Although public complaints remain high, they are not commensurate with oversight and law enforcement. As a result, violations are repeated, leading to public criticism of #percumalaporpolisi (it is useless [for the people] to make a report to the police) and widespread virality of police abuse cases.This contrasts with the situation during the 1998 Reformation, when the public strongly defended the POLRI, believing its integration into the ABRI would weaken it and render it unprofessional. The current situation is extremely dangerous, as few still believe the POLRI deserves to be defended and maintained as an institution responsible for maintaining security. Instead, the public praises the Fire Department and compares the police to Bank Central Asia s security guards!Many argue that the National Police should be repositioned under a ministry, rather than remaining under the President as it is currently, and becoming a political tool of the President and political elites. This argument seeks to equalize the TNI, which is under the Minister of Defense, although even being under a minister does not guarantee the TNI's freedom from political interference.ConclusionThe National Police Reform has been implemented since 1999, in the form of the National Police Structural Reform which places the National Police under the President, the National Police Instrumental Reform which changes the law and various regulations of the POLRI to become a professional, humanistic, and human rights-respecting civil institution, as well as the National Police Cultural Reform which requires a change in the mindset and culture set of the POLRI to become a civil police, eliminating militaristic traits, corrupt culture, hedonistic lifestyle, and arrogance, and increasing professionalism.The lack of success of the National Police Cultural Reform requires all leaders and members to collectively change their mindset and culture to meet public expectations. Changes must be made across all aspects, particularly with regard to clean recruitment, education, and assignments that prioritize professionalism, strict guidance and supervision, and firm rewards and punishments.The public must oversee the National Police Cultural Reform until the desired changes are truly realized, particularly the establishment of a new police culture as a professional, clean, and human rights-respecting civilian police force in carrying out its duties to serve, protect, and uphold the law to maintain public order and security.

Following the Myanmar military coup in February 2021, people in Myanmar fought against the military and workers were one of the main forces to lead the struggles. The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) campaign started by medical workers on February 2 was the first move to encourage people to resist. It was spilt over to other groups such as, teachers, students, railway workers, and other government workers who are working for the Myanmar military and their linked business. Four days after the launch of the CDM movement, workers working in the garment factories took to the street chanting, We want democracy, we don t want the military dictatorship! on February 6. Their participation created a momentum to enlarge the protests. By the next day, Myanmar streets were full of people demanding democracy and the release of political prisoners. It has been four years during which the plights of people have been aggravated. According to a report in 2024, Myanmar military had already killed 5,712 people and arrested nearly 28,000 people. The Myanmar military increased a lot of restrictions and made sure to hold the power in a fascist manner. It is time to look into the experiences of workers: how they have organized their resistance and how they have continued to struggle against the oppression of the state and employers under the military dictatorship. 2021 Coup: Workers Responses and Military s Oppression One of the reasons for workers quickly to organize a sizable mass for the protests was that they had developed a group to connect different unions and labor organizations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, from late 2019 to 2020, the employers of garment factories in Myanmar dismissed workers for the workforce reduction. Not surprisingly the majority of dismissed workers were factory-level union leaders and members. To protect against this kind of union-busting technique, trade unions and labor rights organizations formed a watchdog group to monitor the union-busting cases. The watchdog group became the organized front of Myanmar labor movement for the country s democracy as a network when the military staged a coup in February 2021. This network of labor rights groups, later known as Myanmar Labor Alliance, quickly voiced demands for the immediate release of all political prisoners and showed their stand against the coup. Labor unions inside factories protested in their workplaces to show solidarity with the network s demands. Workers, who had played a remarkable role and shown commitment in various historic moments including the independence and pro-democracy movements, again initiated the massive strike on 6 February 2021. Federation of General Workers Myanmar (FGWM) and its allies played a crucial role in mobilizing the massive protests. Due to their power and capacity to organize, the unions were one of the first targets suppressed by the military. The military declared that 16 trade unions and labor organizations were illegal in March 2021, and arrested union leaders inside factories. Over 300 unionists and labor activists were arrested and 55 unionists were murdered. Workers Situation After the Military Coup The garment sector, which was hit by both the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup, is still essential for the country s economy under the European Union s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme which was reinstated in 2013. In post-coup Myanmar, the garment sector has faced severe instability with the closure of nearly 150 factories and the loss of more than 200,000 jobs. However, some factories remain in operation. According to the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA), there were 530 active factories as of September 2023. At the same time, labor rights violations and poor working conditions have only worsened. The labor relations have reverted to authoritarianism under military rule. Employers have taken advantage of the political turmoil to oppress the workers and undermine the labor unions by siding with the military junta. Meanwhile, working conditions have been deteriorated further, and labor activism has been severely restricted under political oppression. Nevertheless, workers have continued to organize strikes and voice demands for better working conditions amidst political oppression although they violently suppressed. In some cases, the employers called the military to crack down on strikers. Therefore, some members of prominent trade unions such as FGWM went underground and continued their activities in exile while other unionists carried on working inside the country. In this section, we discuss the new labor movement landscape in post-coup Myanmar by exploring working conditions such as wages, working hours, gendered experiences exacerbated by the military coup, dispute resolution mechanisms, and changes in labor recruitment. Wage Workers have been hit hardest by economic instability, with rising prices of basic commodities and a stagnant minimum wage of 4,800 Myanmar Kyat (MMK) (approximately 1.48 USD) per day, the lowest in ASEAN countries. Workers demanded a higher minimum wage before 2020, but the process was stalled due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 coup. The rapidly increasing exchange rate of the US dollar has further worsened their livelihoods. Following the coup, the sharp depreciation of currency was the major factor of raising commodity price, making the current minimum wage inadequate. In 2023, the junta s directive mandated an additional 1,000 MMK to be added to the minimum wage. According to the Notification No. 2/2023 of the Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population under State Administration Council (SAC), a ruling body of military junta, workers at private-sector employers with more than 10 employees were entitled to minimum daily wage of 5,800 MMK (approx. 2.77 USD) an increase of 1,000 MMK per eight-hour workday over the previous minimum wage of 4,800 MMK per day. The changes took effect on October 1, 2023. This was intended to ease the dissatisfaction of workers with the military regime. Even before the official notification, in some factories, workers successfully bargained to increase the wages to 5,600 MMK per day. After this announcement, most factories provided 5,800 MMK. However, a union leader said, even this amount is not sufficient for workers to provide their families. Importantly, the 1,000 MMK is not considered of the official minimum wage increase, thus, excluding from overtime calculations. Overtime pay is calculated on the statutory minimum wage of 4,800 MMK, resulting in an hourly overtime rate of 1,200 MMK (twice the base rate of 600 MMK/hour). Even worse, some factories continue to ignore the law. And other factories offset the wage increase by cutting other benefits such as professional fees and overtime pay. With wages falling short of living costs, many workers depend on experience bonus, attendance bonus and overtime wages. Some garment factories have withheld overtime payment, claiming workers failed to meet production targets on time. In August 2024, the regime increased the additional allowance by another 1,000 MMK bringing it to a total of 2,000 MMK. As a result, daily wage workers now earn 6,800 MMK per day. However, overtime pay is still calculated based on the statutory minimum wage of 4,800 MMK. Increased labor intensity and forced overtime Although labor exploitation was common before the coup, post-coup situations have worsened. Employers have increasingly violated the employment contracts (EC) and raised the production targets to unbearable levels, resulting in forced overtime. Ma Ei, a joint secretary and central committee member of FGWM told us; The employers used to assign more production targets in post-coup Myanmar. In a Chinese-owned factory, workers have to meet 120-150 targets per hour, which is unbelievably high for a worker to meet. To meet the target, workers have to work overtime, which is forcibly assigned by employers. However, the employers disguised it as voluntary by forcing the workers to give consent . Before the coup, production targets were around 60 pieces per hour. Since the coup, factories have arbitrarily raised them. A worker from E P Fashion, a Chinese-owned garment factory, described her experience to Myanmar Labour News, a local media outlet and labor right advocacy group in Myanmar; In our factory, we have to sew CUH-branded clothes with 100 workers. The employers required us to meet more than 100 targets per hour. Even though we are working without a rest or going to the toilet, it is impossible to meet the target. In that case, supers (leaders) shouted at us harshly. Similarly, Tianjin Fashion Milestone Garment factory, owned by a Chinese and located in Hlaing Thar Yar Township, presents another example of a sharp increase in production targets. The factory employs around 1,400 workers who have to work from 7:30 AM to 8:00 PM, without provided transportation for commuting. Even when workers skip toilet breaks to keep up, the target is impossible to meet. The employers also confiscate workers cell phones and continue to violate employment contracts. Gendered Experiences The garment sector, employing approximately 90% women workers, has long been notorious for sexual and verbal harassment by employers, managers, leaders, and male co-workers (ILO 2018). Even before the military coup women workers faced verbal and sexual harassment during their commute to and from the workplace partly due to the lack of employer-provided transportation. Since the coup, these gendered experiences have been compounded by diminished safety and security. Ma Ei and Ma Khin, executive committee members of FGWM, explained; Women workers are not only harassed in the workplace but also on their way from duty station to their places and vice versa. Factory s lack of transportation support and forced overtime, especially amidst the diminished safety and security as a result of the military coup, exacerbate the harassment. In addition to workplace harassment, the military rule itself long associated with sexism and patriarchy has perpetuated sexual exploitation of women workers. On March 25, 2023, two women workers from the No.11 Garment Factory located in Pakkhokhu, Magway Region, were raped by the soldiers and members of the Pyu Saw Htee (a military-affiliated militia group). According to DVB News, these women workers were stopped at the checkpoint while returning home. The soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee members claimed that they were carrying scissors, abducted them and later assaulted them. Both workers subsequently died by suicide. The Ayeyarwaddy Times, a local new outlet, also reported that unmarried women workers from a military-owned factory located in Hlaing Thar Yar Township, Yangon, were forcibly sent to work in the houses of the military generals in Nay Pyi Taw. One victim recounted; We have to do household chores that include washing and ironing their clothes. Sometimes, we have to massage them which sometimes includes sexual harassment . FGWM received the cases of sexual exploitation and rape cases as reported by the workers. Ma Ei and Ma Khin confirmed; A woman worker from a factory located in Hlaing Thar Yar, on the outskirt of Yangon, was raped on their way home. But the employers covered up the case and claimed that she had resigned. They further affirmed; In VIP (Very Impressive Prospects) factory, the Chinese employers committed sexual harassment against women workers. It happened after the coup. According to Ma Khin, many cases remain unreported, as employers exploit the absence of rule of law to silence victims. Despite the 2012 Social Security Law which entitles maternity leave, miscarriage benefits, paternity leave, and related expenses, women are denied these entitlements. To avoid providing them the factories prefer to recruit younger women and these women workers have to undergo pregnancy tests before and after employment. Since the military coup, the dismissal of pregnant women workers has become increasingly common. Another gendered hardship has been the growing difficulty in affording sanitary napkins. Low wage, soaring prices for basic goods, inadequate bathrooms, and restricted toilet breaks have worsened menstrual health conditions. A woman worker told her experience on the စက်ချုပ်သမ(Seik Choup Tha Ma) , a local blog which documents the struggles of women workers in the garment sector as follows; In our factory, there are no adequate toilets. Before the coup, I changed the menstrual pads three times a day. However, after the coup, I cannot afford to do so due to price increase and my low wages. the factory also began to limit the toilet time. When the management caught us looking for the pads, they scolded and shouted at us harshly. To avoid this, we used wasted fabrics as pads. We know that it is unhygienic but we have no other options. Currently, menstrual pads cost 1,500~2,000 MMK an amount increasingly unaffordable for workers. Restricted toilet breaks and inadequate facilities also undermine women workers reproductive health, leading to conditions such as uterine diseases. However, the right to access to medical benefits remains denied. In fact, these gendered struggles are not new. Women workers have long fought not only against the exploitative practices of factory management but also against patriarchal attitudes within some labor unions. In the years leading up to the military coup, some women unionists, frustrated and disillusioned with old-guard male union leaders who perpetuated gender inequality, established new labor unions such as the Solidarity Trade Union of Myanmar (STUM). Threat to Collective Bargaining and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms In November 2022, nearly two years after Myanmar s military coup, the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA), the main employers organization in the garment sector, launched a Voluntary Labor Compliance Assessment (VLCA) tool and an accompanying grievance mechanism. The stated aim was to guarantee compliance with national labor laws among member factories. In other words, it aimed to ensure workers the rights to which they are entitled. However, labor law violations persisted in the garment sector and beyond. In January 2024, Myanmar s parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG), blacklisted 64 senior members of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) for cooperating with the military regime to avoid penalties for labor law violations. Among those blacklisted was MGMA secretary general Khine Khine Nwe, which evidenced that the VLCA was largely ineffectual. However, NUG has no viable alternative to ensure labor law compliance in Myanmar factories. Under the 2021 Settlement of Labour Disputes Law, factories with more than 30 workers are required to form a Workplace Coordination Committee (WCC), consisting of two representatives each from employers and workers. The WCC is an important body to resolve disputes and facilitate collective bargaining. If the WCC fails to reach an agreement, cases can be filed to the Township Conciliation Body (TCB), then to the State or Regional Arbitration Body (AB), and ultimately to the National Arbitration Council (AC), if necessary. Even before the coup, the dispute resolution system was not effective. Many factories failed to establish WCCs and the employers often ignored rulings such as reinstating the unjustly dismissed workers for participating in strikes. Labor activists have long argued that the penalties for violations are too small to force compliance (BSR 2017). Since the coup, genuine labor unions have not been able to operate or form. Instead, employers and management increasingly replace them with yellow unions or fake unions, which work in favor of the employers. The WCC are also formed with representatives from these yellow unions to create the appearance of compliance and convince foreign brands. FGWM leaders Ma Ei and Ma Khin observed; Employers and management are trying to replace the labor unions and form WCC with yellow unions in every factory. For instance, in Saung Oo Shwe Nay (Golden Sunshine) Company, which produces for H M, MOHITO, and SMOG brands with around 1,800 workers, management sought to replace the functioning workers union with a yellow union. According to a unionist, A lot of workers rights violations are taking place in the factory such as breach of the employment contracts and union busting. The management ignored the workers demands and when the workers union tried to negotiate, they attempted to replace us with a yellow union by collecting workers loyal to them, Under the military regime, employers called in the military junta to intimidate striking workers rather than engaged in peaceful negotiation.On June 8 2023, at Hoseng Garment in Shwe Pyi Thar Township, which produces for Index and Zara, workers organized a strike to demand an increase in the minimum wage from 4,800 MMK (2.29 USD) to 5,600 MMK (2.67 USD). Management initially agreed to negotiate but on June 10, they dismissed seven union leaders involved in the strike. On June 14, the dismissed workers were summoned to the local office of the the Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population (MOLIP) in Shwe Pyi Thar, located in an area under martial law. Instead of resolving the dispute, one of the seven dismissed workers was arrested. That same day, the workers continued the strike, demanding the reinstatement of the dismissed leaders. Management again called in the military. Video footage released by workers and published by Myanmar Labor News, showed a junta officer violently threatening the strikers; This is your choice to work in this factory, no one invited you to work in here. There is always give and take. Of course, the factory will cut your monthly wage and attendance bonus if you join the strike instead of working. When a worker replied; We don t want any trouble. We just organized the strike to demand increased minimum wage and to reinstate the dismissed unionists. In response, the officer shouted at her in a harsh and threatening tone.; Are these unionists your relatives? Know your life! Remember that this is under martial law. There is no such thing as a union under military rule. While FGWM continues to provide advice, support to the workers and disseminates the news by posting updates on Facebook, those who contact the union, face threats and pressure from management. The management prohibited the factory workers from contacting FGWM. According to Ma Ei; Although the workers got threatened and pressured by the factory and management team, they (the factory and management team) are really afraid of our news and other labor-related news in the media. When this news is widely spread, the authorities from the Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population department (MOLIP), conducts investigations. So, we can say there are both positive and negative impacts. Ko Aung Gyi from Myanmar Labor News also confirmed; When we publish violation cases on our website, the MOLIP investigates. Nevertheless, employers only allow workers who are on their side to speak to these officials. Therefore, we cannot expect good results. Employers threatened the workers who contact and report to us. And sometimes, employers try to bribe us to delete the news. In other cases, workers are forced to say the reports are fake. Rather than genuinely protecting workers rights, ministry officials investigate mainly to prevent negative publicity that could scare off investors. Employers, for their part, use yellow unions and WCCs to maintain the illusion that dispute resolution mechanisms are functioning. Conscription and Labor On February 12 2024, the military activated the People s Military Service Law, the conscription law, a measure dating back to the previous military regimes under General Ne Win and later amended by General Than Shwe. The law stipulates that men aged 18-35, women aged 18-27, as well as men aged 18-45, and women aged 18-35 with specialized skills, are subject to conscription. Despite these stated criteria, citizens of all ages and genders are concerned and panicked as the military junta often disregards legal provisions and acts arbitrarily. Following the enforcement of the law, overseas migration of male workers increased sharply. According to Ko Aung Gyi of Myanmar Labor News, some employers have been involved in the forceful recruitment of male workers, collaborating with authorities to collect workers bio-metric data. Workers also told Western News that the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), an organization to safeguard business interests, has been collecting the personal data of male workers and handing it over to the military. Initially, the garment sector was unaffected as factories replaced male workers with women in positions such as cutting and packaging. However, the female labor supply has also dwindled due to low wages and fears related to the conscription law especially 2 years after the coup. As a result, employers are now trying to retain female workers by engaging with unionists and offering wage increases. However, workers view these attempts as insincere. Some workers see this moment as an opportunity to push for higher daily wages. Many factories under the Federation of Garment Workers Myanmar (FGWM), along with others, have begun making such demands. Workers from different factories are learning from each other to raise their demands. When we demand wages, one thing to be cautious about is the legal-binding issue. What employers are trying to offer is to provide additional fees as financial support to the daily wages. It is not legally binding. So employers cut the fees from the daily wages on the other hand. The factories with strong unions can organize for demanding wages in solidarity and systematically with the employment agreements. Case Study Even with virtually no possibility of collective bargaining under the dismantled rule of law, workers in Myanmar continued to organize strikes until 2024 - three years after the military coup. Strikes demanding better working conditions and higher minimum wage were routinely met with dismissals, a common occurrence in every post-coup industrial action. Employers have also used threats of factory closure to suppress strikes. In many cases, employers shut down operations temporarily without compensation or notice. Nevertheless, workers never gave up as shown in the case below. (1) Dare to Fight: Workplace Strike at Sioen Myanmar Garment Workers at Sioen Myanmar Garment organized a workplace strike in May 2024. To better understand how the strike was organized and what changes resulted from it, we interviewed Ma Khin Thandar Moe, who was a former union leader at the factory. Sioen factory is owned by a Belgian company and produces its own brand, Sioen, which includes lumber jackets, hiking suits, and uniforms for US soldiers. The soldier uniforms have strict standards and require high quality. Before the coup, the factory operated with around 1,200 workers. In post-coup Myanmar, although the number has dropped to about 700 workers, the factory continues to operate, producing approximately 35,000 pieces per month. Ma Khin, a woman worker and union leader, was arrested on 24 August 2021 along with other union leaders for her involvement in the anti-junta movement and social media posts. Later, she was released and fled to the Thai-Myanmar border where she has continued her labor right activism under the Federation of General Workers Myanmar (FGWM). According to Myanmar Labor News, the factory used the political crisis to oppress workers. In 2022, three workers including a female leader were arrested by the SAC, for supporting the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). In February of that year 60 workers were illegally laid off. On 14 May 2024, Sioen workers began a workplace strike that lasted three and a half days, marking a bold act of resistance under repressive conditions. (2) Mobilizing the Workers in Post-Coup Myanmar Like many garment factories, the management of Sioen Myanmar Garment has made persistent union-busting efforts. Before the coup, the factory had an active labor union. However, following the arrest of four union leaders early in the coup, the union became largely inactive, although some union leaders remain engaged discreetly. The factory became the very first where workers demand for an increase from 5,800 MMK to 6,800 MMK, including the additional fees, was met. Before the military coup, it was relatively easier to organize the strikes. Nowadays, it requires discretion and careful planning. In the days leading up to the strike, former union leaders held over 10 secret meetings to discuss and strategize around the demand for a 6,800 MMK minimum wage. Then, workers were informed discreetly, often during lunchtime or outside the factory premises. Despite the risks, the former union leaders who had previous organizing experience believed that the workers would stand with them and join the strikes. And they were right. Approximately two-thirds of the workers joined the strikes on the first day by refusing to return to work and instead gathering in the dining rooms. According to Ma Khin, the former union leader at the factory, Even though the labor union at the factory remained relatively inactive, former union leaders are there and influential. Most importantly, the workers at Sioen have always shown strong solidarity. The labor union was militant before the military coup and consistently led the fights for workers rights. That history of activism earned the workers trust, which was crucial in organizing this strike. In addition, workers see the demand for a higher minimum wage was a collective right. (3) Without WCC, How Were the Demands Addressed? While many employers replaced genuine workers unions with employer-friendly yellow unions in other factories, this factory has no yellow union. From the start, workers informed the management that a labor union still existed at the factory, even though it temporarily paused its activities due to limited space for labor activism. Despite several attempts to form yellow unions by the employer, workers didn t accept them. Nevertheless, the employer could form a Workplace Coordination Committee (WCC). It is only a one-sided initiative by the employer, which does not represent the workers interests. The workers don t recognize this WCC and instead handle the disputes directly with the employers. To lead negotiations, the workers established their own group consisting of 10 leaders from 10 lines, who are recognized by the workers as legitimate representatives. These representatives are responsible for negotiating with the employer and ensuring workers compliance with employment contracts. In addition to the demand for a minimum wage increase, workers also raised other concerns such as expanding the dining room and setting defined lunch hours, improving toilet facilities, arranging additional buses for commuting, ensuring social security benefits, and addressing feedback submitted through the suggestion box. The strike lasted for three and a half days, during which many workers either stayed in the dining room or refused to return to work. After this period, the employer began negotiations and agreed to increase the minimum wage to 6,800 MMK. The employer also consented to compensate workers for one and a half day wage lost during the strike. However, other demands remained unaddressed. One of the reasons the employer agreed to increase the minimum wage was because the Sioen factory produces its own high-quality brand. So, the employer doesn t want to lose the current workers, who are familiar with brands standards and quality requirements. Hiring and training new workers would be costly explained Ma Khin. Before the coup, a piece of Sioen-branded clothing costs around 350,000 MMK. Each production line usually made 100 to 200 pieces daily and the factory had 10 lines in total. Ma Khin recalled, During our first strike in August 2019 when we demanded an increase from 3,600 MMK to 4,800 MMK, the strike lasted only one day before the employer agreed. Additionally, the labor shortage in the country exacerbated by the conscription law and economic instability, causing many workers to migrate to neighboring countries for work, likely influenced the employer s willingness to agree with the workers demands. (4) Resistance as a Solution The success of the Sioen strike serves as an encouraging example for other factories. Following this, several factories have began to demand higher minimum wages. According to FGWM, some factories have achieved their demands. Three years after the coup, skyrocketing commodity prices have severely affected workers. For instance, the price of oil costs around 17,000~18,000 MMK, while half a gallon (1.89 kg) of the lowest quality rice affordable to working-class families costs around 7,000~8,000 MMK significantly higher than the daily wage of 5,800 MMK. Personally, I believe that the oppression at the various levels have made workers strong enough to resist. They have no options left except resistance. They ve got nothing more to lose. An important lesson we ve learned is that when we fight in solidarity, we can achieve what we demand, reflected Ma Khin on the overall situation. Conclusion The garment sector in Myanmar has become increasingly notorious for exploitative working conditions, severely worsened by the dual impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup. Workers have been deeply affected by soaring prices of basic commodities, making their already precarious situation even more difficult. Despite the shrinking space for labor organizing caused by political oppression and aggressive union busting, workers continue to find ways to organize strikes and demand higher wages. The labor regulations under the military junta, which holds the de facto power, especially in the urban areas where the factories are mainly located, fail to protect the workers rights. Employers exploit the ongoing political turmoil to further oppress workers. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor under the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by the elected leaders in the 2020 election, has been unable to offer any meaningful protection for workers rights since the military coup. While broader political issues have dominated attention, workers concerns have largely been sidelined in both NUG s agenda and mainstream politics. As demonstrated by the case study of the Sioen strike, workers, who feel they have nothing left to lose, see organizing strikes as the only means to defend their labor rights when neither the current labor regulations under the military junta nor the NUG government can provide adequate protections. Against all odds, workers in Myanmar continue to courageously organize labor strikes to assert their rights.

Abstract Public Diplomacy 2.0 for Singapore: Celebrating 50 Years of Korea-Singapore TiesJin-wook HONG (Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the Republic of Singapore)Marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Singapore in 2025, this article traces the evolution of their bilateral ties and explores strategic pathways for future cooperation. Over the past five decades, the two countries have expanded collaboration in a wide range of sectors, including politics, security, economy, culture, and education, while embracing multilateralism, a rules-based international order, and open trade. Our partnership has further advanced into emerging domains such as advanced technology, supply chain resilience, digital transformation, and sustainable development. To ensure the sustainable advancement of the strategic partnership between our two nations, intergovernmental cooperation is indispensable ; however, securing firm public support in both countries for the bilateral relationship is of even greater significance. Achieving this requires the sustained, consistent, and systematic implementation of public diplomacy. According to the perception surveys jointly conducted by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Singapore and local media in 2024, and a public opinion survey by ISEAS, Korea enjoys high cultural favorability in Singapore and Southeast Asia, while perceptions of Korea as a reliable strategic cooperation partner remain insufficient. Continuing to actively utilize the K-wave, we should not remain merely at the level of consuming cultural products, but should expand the scope of our public diplomacy into other diverse area. We should also promote a Team Korea approach in which the Korean government, Korean companies, and overseas Koreans work together in an organic and coordinated manner. By engaging mainstream mass media and key digital influencers as policy stakeholders and partners, Korea can strengthen its strategic credibility and solidify its position as one of Singapore s most trusted partners.Source: Jin-wook HONG. "Public Diplomacy 2.0 for Singapore : Celebrating 50 Years of Korea-Singapore Ties." JISEAS Issue Paper No. 41. (14 August 2025) Jeonju, Korea.

Abstract Achievements and Challenges of Education on Southeast Asia in the Division of International and Area Studies (DIAS), Pukyong National UniversityBubmo JUNG (Pukyong National University)As part of the government s CK (University for Creative Korea) project and CORE (Initiative for COllege of humanities Research and Education) project, the Division of International and Area Studies (DIAS) at Pukyong National University (PKNU) restructured its curriculum in 2015. This effort complemented the division s educational strategy of emphasizing regional studies and local languages in addition to subject-matter expertise. To achieve this, the Division of International and Area Studies hired numerous full-time Southeast Asian specialists and established a foundation for Southeast Asian studies education, including the inclusion of Vietnamese as a required foreign language course. This has resulted in increased undergraduate interest in Southeast Asia, and an increasing number of graduate students writing theses on the region in the newly established Graduate School of Global Area Studies. Furthermore, the Division of International and Area Studies has participated in the AIMS (ASEAN International Mobility for Students) program, which fosters student exchanges with universities in Southeast Asia, sending or inviting students to universities in Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This human exchange has led to increased demand for development cooperation-related internships and job/startup opportunities in Southeast Asia, and has resulted in students pursuing graduate studies on Southeast Asia or working as practitioners in national projects related to Southeast Asia. However, the lack of a separate Southeast Asia-related major at undergraduate or graduate level and the lack of promising career paths related to the region remain limitations. Source: Bubmo JUNG (Pukyong National University). "Achievements and Challenges of Education on Southeast Asia in the Division of International and Area Studies (DIAS), Pukyong National University." JISEAS Issue Paper No. 40. (11 August 2025) Jeonju, Korea.

Green Transition in ASEAN: Catalyst for Sustainable Economic Development?Young Kyung KO (Yonsei University) This article examines whether the green transition in ASEAN can serve as a viable driver of sustainable economic growth, and what conditions are required for this potential to be realized. Facing both the global climate crisis and the middle-income trap, ASEAN stands at a crossroads where decarbonization efforts may also provide an opportunity for structural economic transformation. Drawing on green growth theory, the Porter Hypothesis, and endogenous growth models, the analysis explores ASEAN s natural resources, policy frameworks, and industrial structure. It highlights both the region s visible progress including the expansion of renewable energy, cross-border electricity integration, and the emergence of green industries and the persistent challenges such as limited private investment, technological constraints, fragmented institutions, and rising concerns about greenwashing. With world-class solar and geothermal potential and high biodiversity, ASEAN has the capacity to generate trillions of dollars in economic output and millions of green jobs by 2050. However, unlocking this potential requires coordinated policy reform, including carbon pricing, the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies, expansion of green finance, and investment in innovation. In this context, Korea can play a key role as a strategic partner, leveraging its green technologies and experience to support ASEAN s sustainable transition. Young Kyung KO. "Green Transition in ASEAN: Catalyst for Sustainable Economic Development?" JISEAS Issue Paper No. 39. (5 August 2025) Jeonju, Korea.

"2024 Indonesian Election: The Rise of Authoritarian Politics and Political Dynasty"by Hyung-Jun KIM (Department of Cultural Anthropology, Kangwon National University)AbstractThis paper summarizes the process and outcomes of the 2024 Indonesian election, which included the selection of the president and vice president, members of the national parliament, regional representatives, and local council members. It also explores the potential for changes in Indonesian democracy. A significant highlight of these elections was Prabowo Subianto s landslide victory, supported by President Jokowi, alongside the PDI-P's ability to retain its status as the leading party despite a significant defeat in the presidential race. The election process conspicuously displayed the expansion of dynastic politics, centered around specific families, while identity politics seemed to have a minimal impact. The election of Prabowo as president, given his resources and determination to monopolize political power, is viewed as having the potential to disrupt the current political equilibrium and to bolster authoritarian tendencies.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 31.

"Rebuilding Timor-Leste's Education System"by Eunsook Jung (Assistant Dean, College of Letters and Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison)AbstractTimor-Leste is one of the youngest countries in the world. It regained independence in 2002 after experiencing hundreds of years of colonialism combined by Portugal, Japan, and Indonesia. Education during the colonial period served as a tool for indoctrinating Timorese that they were the second-class citizens. With the enduring impact of colonialism on education, Timor-Leste must build its education system from the ground up, which can be suitable for its citizens.In this essay, I examine how the Timor-Leste government has rebuilt its education system after the decades of struggle and what challenges and constraints remain in the current education system. After conducting field research, my observations are as follows. First, although the Timor-Leste government recognizes the importance of decolonization, education is not free from colonial legacies. Second, Timor-Leste has improved access to education over time to the great extent. However, the quality of education still lacks severely. Third, adopting multipleofficial languages has posed challenges to people in communicating with one another. It can be a source of inequality at the same time. Without political will to reduce language barriers and a sizeable investment in the education sector, these problems are likely to persist.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 30.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 29""Will 'Operation 1027' Advance Myanmar's Spring?"by Heesuk KIM (Research Fellow, JISEAS) Jinyoung Park(Research Fellow, JISEAS)AbstractOn October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a military coalition of three ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), launched an offensive on 12 places against Myanmar s military junta in northern Shan State. 'Operation 1027', named after the date of the military action, became a starting point of simultaneous attacks to capture hundreds of junta camps and positions, block main trading roads to China, and secure significant cities across the country. Several anti-military rebels have jointly conducted the following operations. They are old EAOs and a new military resistance group, the People s Defense Forces. It is regarded as a big surprise to witness the unprecedented alliance between various rebels and to observe the massive losses of the Myanmar armed forces, one of the most potent military powers in Southeast Asia. In this aspect, 'Operation 1027' may herald a new phase of the protracted confrontation between the regime and the opposition. This article explores the implications of 'Operation 1027' on the current development of armed insurgencies. We first explain the historical background related to the current situation; second, examine some characteristics and developments of the joint offensive; third, investigate the influences of the China factor; and lastly, suggest some future tasks to move forward to a new phase.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 29.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 28"The Story of Elementary School Students to Grow Together with Indonesian Class"by Changkeun LEE (Teacher, Jeonju Jeolla Elemantary School)AbstractThis paper covers the story of an elementary school with a yearly program to help students learn about Indonesia through various teaching methods. These included online exchanges with a partner school in Indonesia, in-person exchanges through field visits, and classes conducted by Indonesian teachers dispatched to the school for three months. The program enhanced students understanding of the different cultures. I want readers to share the exciting experiences the teachers and the students had while learning about other cultures.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 28.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 27"Southeast Asia in Taiwan: Observation Report of 2023 Asian Conference for Young Scholars of Southeast Asian Studies"by Jooyoung KimAbstractThis issue paper reports the 2023 Asian Conference for Young Scholars of Southeast Asian Studies held at the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies of Academia Sinica in Taiwan on September 11 and 12, 2023. It also provides some observations related to Southeast Asia in Taiwan including Taiwan s Southeast Asian policy direction, Southeast Asian research institutes, and migrant workers from Southeast Asia. I hope this paper may interest readers by sharing what I grasped from this trip.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 27.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 26"2023 Thai General Election and Political Outlook"by Hongkoo KimAbstractOn May 14, Thailand held a general election. As a result of the general election, the opposition Kau Klai Party(Move Forward Party) came first and Pheua Thai Party came second. By building an opposition coalition around the two parties, it secured 312 seats in the House of Representatives and nominated Pita Limjaroenrat of the Kau Klai Party as its candidate for the Prime Minister. However, in the first and second joint sessions of the Senate and House of Representatives, Pita was not elected the Prime Minister because he failed to secure a majority. Under the current method of electing the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister can only be elected with the support of a majority (376 votes) of both houses in a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives (250 seats in the Senate and 500 seats in the House of Representatives).After two unsuccessful attempts to become the Prime Minister due to opposition from the Senate, which supported the old ruling parties, Kau Klai Party passed the baton to the second party in the opposition coalition, Pheu Thai Party. However, Pheu Thai Party broke with the previous opposition coalition, which excluded Kau Klai Party and joined forces with the pro-junta Palang Pracharat Party, Ruam Thai Sang Chart Party, Bhumjaithai Party. With the support of the Senate, Srettha Thavisin of Pheu Thai Party was elected the Prime Minister with 482 votes, well over the majority.As a result, Pheu Thai Party allied with the military, a long-time political opponent, in its quest for power. This has drawn condemnation from hardliners within Pheu Thai Party and Kau Klai Party, as well as from civil society. The political situation is expected to lead to further political instability.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 26.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 25"2023 Cambodian General Election: an Election for Power Succession"by Yeonsik JeongAbstractCambodia s seventh general election was held in Cambodia on July 23. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP), the ruling party, won 120 out of 125 seats in the House of Representatives with 77.89% of the vote. What drew more attention than the Party's victory was the fact that power was passed through the election. It was unusual in that it was a collective succession of power in which Prime Minister Hun Sen's eldest son, Hun Manet, succeeded to the Prime Minister's post while others passed their ministerial positions to their children. The landslide victory of the CPP was made possible by excluding rival parties from the election as well as the disappearance of alternative forces and the expansion of the Party's support base. In an electoral authoritarian system like Cambodia, winning an election is a legal tactic to eliminate competitors and to replicates the victory through a legislative dictatorship. The CPP activated this mechanism in the 2023 general election, completing the hereditary power succession leading to permanent power and evolving into a pseudo-democracy in which undemocratic attributes become rarely visible.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 25.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 24"Southeast Asia Summer Institute: Its History, Accomplishments, and Implications"by Eunsook JungAbstractThe Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute (hereafter, SEASSI) is an intensive eight-week Southeast Asian language program, created by a consortium of various universities in USA. For the last 40 years, SEASSI has provided a myriad of students with opportunities to learn Southeast Asian languages and cultures, and also to build friendship with other scholars in the field. Since the first SEASSI was held in 1983 at both Ohio University and the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, the institute has continued to grow. The University of Wisconsin-Madison has been hosting SEASSI every summer since 2000 and has built a strong foundation for the institute.Given SEASSI s long tradition and accomplishments, I will discuss its history, accomplishments, and challenges in this paper. I will first review the history of SEASSI by highlighting the roles of the federal government of the United States of America and its collaborations with various universities. Second, I will explain how SEASSI operates in terms of its recruitment, curriculum, extra-curricular activities, and finances. Last, I will discuss the challenges faced by SEASSI and suggest some ways forward. This paper is based on the official reports of SEASSI from 2018 to 2021, in-depth interviews with key informants who have been involved in the process of building SEASSI, and secondary resources.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 24.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 23"Retrospection and Prospects of the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and Vietnam: Interview with a Vietnam Expert"by Yangsoo Bae, Yong-Hun Beak and Jooyoung KimAbstractIn commemoration of the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and Vietnam, this issue paper contains an interview with Professor Yangsoo Bae of the Department of Vietnamese Language at Busan University of Foreign Studies, who is the first generation to study in Vietnam and has been striving to foster exchanges between the two countries and nurturing the next generations. The story of Professor Yangsoo Bae who studied in Vietnam in the early 1990s when it was not easy to study in the communist society and established himself as a Vietnam expert in Korea, is an interesting window that shows the changes in relations between the two countries. Professor Yonghun Beak of Dankook University were specially invited to talk with Professor Yangsoo Bae about private exchange activities, nurturing the next generation through education, and the future prospects of Korea-Vietnam relations.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 23.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 22"Refugee Health in Malaysia"by Jeonghyeon KimAbstractUnder what conditions, would the refugees rights to health be improved, particularly in the states that are not a party to the Refugee Convention? To answer the question, this paper analyzes the situation of refugees in Malaysia with the data gained from field research conducted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in July 2022. This paper argues that refugee-led community organizations(RCOs) are the critical policy actors that complement and advance the refugee health and medical programs operated by IOs and NGOs in Malaysia. RCOs take collective actions to solve the refugee issues independently with better knowledge and understanding of the refugee situations derived from the same language, religion, ethnicity, and shared experience of persecution from the country of origin. As a significant social capital, RCOs play a role as mediators and facilitators at the center of a three-tier partnership with IOs and NGOs to improve the refugee protection programs in Malaysia.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 22.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 21"Migrant Workers and Civil Society in Singapore"by Jooyoung KIMAbstractThis paper is a record of a short fieldwork on the issue of migrant workers and civil society that I conducted in Singapore from August 9 to 19, 2022. It contains the stories of the government, civil society organizations, and migrant workers communities. The government uses Our Migrant Workers Gallery as a venue to reveal the desired state of migrant workers, employer-employee s relationship, and a systematic response to COVID-19. In this process, the difficulties experienced by migrant workers disappear, and the criticism of civil society is not visible. Civil society is composed of a complex landscape: many charitable organizations have close ties with the government, and there is a lack of room for civil society organizations that are critical to the government policies. Migrant workers communities emphasize the empowerment of migrant workers and create an environment where even limited resistance is possible. However, there is little awareness about the health and medical coverage of migrant workers, or there is still a limit to thinking in the framework of employer s responsibility.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 21.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 20"Three Years of the SEASK:Achievements and Challenges"by Dahye KIm, Hyun Kyoung Kim and Je Seong JeonAbstractThe SEASK (Southeast Asian School in Korea) co-organized by Jeonbuk National University and Busan University of Foreign Studies started in the summer of 2019 and was held five times over three years. The two-week vacation camp was conducted as face-to-face classes every time during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to five Southeast Asian languages (Vietnamese, Indonesian, Thai, Burmese and Khmer), Arabic and Turkish were also taught at the camp. About 300 students, including undergraduate and graduate students from 32 universities from all over the country, as well as scholars, activists, lawyers, and journalists, took the course. Many people have shown interest and support for the SEASK and are requesting a more detailed introduction. Now is the time to review the practices of the past three years. This paper is about the background, process, achievements and challenges of the SEASK. It was written by those who found the language camp together to celebrate the 3rd anniversary and prepare for the next 3 years.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 20.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 19"Labor Movements and Welfare Politics in Indonesia:Interview with a Local Expert in Labor Studies"by Fransiscus S. Joyoadisumarta and Je Seong JeonAbstractIn the 2010s, the Indonesian working class was the critical agent for welfare reform. Organized labor in Indonesia has contributed to establishing a secure universal health care system through complex class mobilization and coalition building. We discussed this matter via e-mail and Zoom meetings with local labor researcher Franciscus S. Joyoadisumarta. He stated that the Indonesian labor organizations were unfamiliar with the concepts of universal health care and social security when the reform began. As a consequence, the concept became a source of controversy among labor organizations with varied ideological roots. This contentious concept and interactions influenced the design of the Social Security Providers Act. While numerous improvements are needed, this law provides access to universal health care to all individuals, not only workers, as part of Indonesia's welfare system. This is one of the success stories of the working class that we might hear on May Day. Furthermore, this example from Indonesia provides strong evidence that the democratic process provides real results for the people.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 19.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 18Youngmi Yang. "The Solidarity of Korean and Myanmar Civil Societies in Retrospect: From the Very First Beginning of 2000." JISEAS Issue Paper No. 18. (March 2022). Jeonju, Korea.The Solidarity of Korean and Myanmar Civil Societies in Retrospect: From the Very First Beginning of 2000Youngmi YangKorean civil society has been engaged with the democratic movement in Myanmar for a significant time period. This article, therefore, aims to review how Korean civil society supported the asylum application processes of Myanmar activists in 2000 and analyzes the characteristics and limitations of the solidarity movement of Korean and Myanmar civil societies during that time. This article suggests that the solidarity movement of civil society actors in the two countries has been lasted for a significant time period and expanded to multiple issue areas, unlike other cases that often temporarily mobilized for a single issue. Thus, by reflecting on the implications of the past, this article contributes to the current studies of the Myanmar crisis which is very likely to prolong the conflictual situation.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 18

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 17 KIM, Hyung Jong. "Implications of ASEAN s Response to the Crisis in Myanmar." JISEAS Issue Paper No. 17. (January 2022). Jeonju, Korea.Abstract Implications of ASEAN s Response to the Crisis in Myanmar KIM Hyung JongAssociate ProfessorDepartment of International Relations, Yonsei University at Wonju ASEAN s responses to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar since the illegal military coup in February 2021 reveals both its limits and possible roles. Authoritarian governments in ASEAN prefer to engage with the illegal military junta in line with ASEAN s non-interference principle which would further imperil the group s coherence and unity. Meanwhile there have been also considerable developments in ASEAN s responses to the junta. ASEAN has mobilized international pressures on the junta without recognizing it though limited dialogues channels. This paper considers the normative aspects of ASEAN s response to the crisis to argues the extended advancement of ASEAN s role can be found in the possible departure from the traditional practice of its norms.* Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 17.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 16 "The Fourth Wave of COVID-19 Outbreak in Vietnam: Focusing on the Government Roles and its Cooperation with Local communities."Abstract:The fourth wave of COVID-19 in Vietnam has been ongoing since the end of April 2021. This study aims to examine the aspects of 1st 3rd and 4th waves in Vietnam and their implications. In particular, this study focuses on the response systems, methods, and disciplines of the central and local governments and social responses to them, from the end of April to the beginning of July. This period corresponds to the time that infection began to spread in two large cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. This study argues that the (central and local) government s proactive response and discipline in dealing with COVID-19, and consistency in the way that discipline is provided to the citizens are important to control the infectious diseases. This paper also derives implications for overcoming the health crisis and epidemics based on the previous? research outcomes. In a context where the autonomy of local government is strengthened, policy responses based on the context of local community are required. Moreover, when it works properly, citizen participation and trust can be enhanced. If this process becomes a virtuous cycle, the code of conduct that can guarantee public safety is also correctly shared among members, which then could have a positive effect on health. * Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 16 written by Dr. Yong Hun Beak.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 15"Can we provide R2P to Myanmar?: The Prospects of International Intervention on the Crime against Humanity committed by Myanmar Military" Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 15, "Can we provide R2P to Myanmar?: The Prospects of International Intervention on the Crime against Humanity committed by Myanmar Military." written by Dr. Jeonghyeon Kim

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 14"A Letter from Kayah State, Myanmar"Please find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 14, "A Letter from Kayah State, Myanmar." written by Dr. Heesuk Kim and Matmonmyosei (pseudonym, Myanmar citizen)

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 13'It is Never Over till It's Over': Military Coup and People's Resistance in MyanmarPlease find the attached filed for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 13, '"It is Never Over till It's Over': Military Coup and People's Resistance in Myanmar." written by Dr. Jinyoung Park

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 12Endless First Wave: The Spread of Covid 19 and Its Reactions in IndonesiaPlease find the attached file for JISEAS Issue Paper No. 12, "Endless First Wave: The Spread of Covid 19 and Its Reactions in Indonesia" written by Dr. Hyung-Jun Kim.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 11 Endang Rokhani and Je Seong JeonImpact of Job Creation Law on Workers' Rights in Indonesia: Interview with a Labor Lawyer and ActivistIn Indonesia, the Job Creation (Omnibus) Law was enacted on November 2, 2020 with the aim of increasing jobs by creating a good environment for business. Many trade unions protested on the streets claiming that this law seriously retreated labor rights, and brought the law to the Constitutional Court. Through e-mail interviews, we heard opinions on the Job Creation Law from Endang Rokhani, a local labor lawyer and activist with 30 years of experience. First of all, as to how it will affect workers' rights, she analyzes that this law brings about seriously infringing changes in the wage and dismissal system. Specifically, she focused on the simplification of the regional minimum wage system, exemption from the obligation to pay the minimum wage for small and micro enterprises, liberalization on the duration of contract workers, allowing unilateral dismissal procedures, and reduction of severance pay. Second, she shares her perspective on the impact on the trade union movements. In the legislative process, the unions carried out resistance in various ways, but not only could not prevent the enactment of unfavorable law, but also divided into three categories, resulting in the possibility of continuing antagonism. In addition, the abolition of the procedure that took into account the recommendations of the Wage Committee, in which the unions participated in determining the regional minimum wage, was expected to weaken the influence of the unions. After the interview, there are additional questions that we will consider together. Despite the recession of the labor rights, there are already dark prospects that new investments to be promoted by this law will not create remarkable jobs. Furthermore, attention is paid to how the new politics, which not only the president and ministers, but also the parliament, are transforming business-friendly, will change the lives of the Indonesian people in the future.

JISEAS Issue Paper No. 10 Jooyoung KIM The Similar Background and a Divergence of the Youth's Solidarity in Social Movements in Thailand and Hong Kong

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 9Title : A Point of Inflection: Crisis and Opportunity of Myanmar s COVID-19 ResponseWriters : Heesuk KIM and Woochul LEE https://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol9.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 8Title : Implications of Vietnam s Rectification of ILO Fundamental Conventions: Interview with the Director of ILO Office for Viet NamWriter : Minji Yoo and Chang-Hee Leehttps://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol8.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 7Title : Labor Politics of Decreasing Arbitration Cases in CambodiaWriter : Jinyoung, PARK https://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol7.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 6Title : The Mythified Quarantine Success in the Developed Asia and Invisible LabourWriter : Minji, YOO https://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol6.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 5Title : The Light and Shadow of Singapore s Responses to COVID-19: Implications of Two Separate Containment StrategiesWriters : Youngran Yang, Heesuk Kimhttps://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol5.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 4Title : Higher Education for Southeast Asian Studies in Korea: Realities and ChallengesWriters : Je Seong Jeon, HyunKyoung Kim, and Sa-Myung Parkhttps://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol4.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 3Title : How Southeast Asia's super app Grab responds to Corona 19Writer : Ko, Young Kyunghttps://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol3.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 2Title : Southeast Asia in the Era of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Note on People-Centered Public Health Approacheswriter : Seo, Bo Kyunghttps://jiseas.jbnu.ac.kr/CrossEditor/binary/files/000002/Vol2.pdf

JISEAS(Jeonbuk National University Institute for Southeast Asian Studies) Issue Paper No 1Title: Southeast Asian against COVID-19 Tentative Evaluation and Implications of the Early Response.Writers: Heesuk Kim, Minji Yoo, Dahye kim, Hyun Kyoung Kim, Youngran Yang, and Je Seong Jeon.http://namose_hyper.link/1587289921200